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1. Introduction
In a recent public address, Justice Beverly McLachlin asked the question, “How 
has the criminal law treated women?” She then answered in part:
... in the past, and to some extent in the present, our criminal law has failed to 
accord equality to women. It has often placed the burden of social problems on 
the backs of women through the so called “feminine crimes” related to reproduc­
tion and sexuality. It has, at least until recently, failed to recognize the situation 
in which many women, such as battered women, find themselves, and the way that 
situation impacts on the traditional criminal law defences. And it has, through the 
misapplication of invalid stereotypes, often treated female offenders as less than 
fully responsible and female victims with cruel insensitivity.1
The problem of wife abuse is not new, nor is the unfairness in law and legal 
decisions which have been brought to bear upon it.
For centuries, our society and others have consistently condoned and 
legitimized male battery of women. This has been done directly through laws and 
policies which expressly allowed for it; and indirectly, through custom, procedures 
and discretionary decisions which ignored, trivialized or blamed victims for this use 
of violence to secure subordination.
When women are battered, they are choked, kicked, bitten, punched, sexually 
assaulted, threatened and hurt by weapons. In a study2 of 100 battered women, 
all had been bruised, but 44 had also received lacerations of which 17 were due 
to attack with a sharp instrument such as a bottle, knife or razor. Twenty-six had 
their noses, teeth or ribs fractured and 8 had fractures of other bones, ranging 
from fingers and arms to jaw and skull. Two had their jaws dislocated and two 
others had similar shoulder injuries. Retinal damage was done to two women and 
one was rendered an epileptic as a result of head and brain injuries. In 19 cases, 
there were allegations of strangulation attempts. Burns and scalds occurred in 
eleven cases, bites in seven. All of the 100 women in the study had been attacked 
with clenched fists, but 39 reported that they were regularly kicked as well. In 42 
cases, a weapon was used on them, usually the first available object, but in 15
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cases this was the same object each time. In 8 cases the weapon was a belt with 
a buckle.
Battering is usually a regular and persistent practice. Thirty-one percent of 
women in shelters report being beaten weekly or daily.3 In 1987, 157,000 wife 
assaults were reported in Canada. In 1989, 76 women were killed by their 
husbands or intimate partners.4 This comprised sixty-two percent of all the 
female murder victims that year. Shootings and physical beatings were the most 
common cause of death in spousal homicides.5
In order to contextualize and make understandable the current deeply- 
embedded societal and legal problems of wife battery, one must understand how 
the past is intertwined with the present. Therefore, the first section of my paper 
will provide a brief historical overview of the legal treatment of wife abuse. The 
second section of the paper will explain how wife battery is a form of sex 
discrimination and why it must be viewed as a social crime in its broader, 
institutionalized context rather than as a personal, isolated, aberrant form of 
behaviour. In the third section, the sex equality dimensions of the problem are 
discussed, and some of the myths that have been used to perpetuate domestic 
assault are addressed. Some cases are examined in order to illuminate the legal 
principles underlying self-defence, provocation, sentencing and contempt charges 
against victims who fail to testify, showing where gender bias works against 
women. It is argued that in order to achieve gender-neutral results in these areas, 
a feminist perspective is required which takes into account the historical, economic 
and physical realities of women. This approach often requires the Courts to move 
beyond formal equality and to treat women differently in order to achieve equality 
of result.
2. History
Wife beating has been condoned throughout history in every part of the world. 
Amongst the earliest known laws is one dating from 2500 B.C., which provided 
that the name of any woman who verbally abused her husband was to be engraved 
on a brick which was then to be used to bash out her teeth.6
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During the Middle Ages, women were burned at the stake for scolding, 
nagging, miscarrying or talking back to their husbands.7 Christian, Jewish and 
Muslim religions in all European countries openly encouraged wife beating. Wives 
were expected to obey their husbands absolutely. If they did not, they could be 
beaten with impunity. If a wife committed adultery, the law permitted her 
husband to kill her.
The 18th and 19th centuries brought no relief to women. Wives had little 
choice but to accept whatever punishment or abuse their husbands meted out. No 
laws protected them from their husband’s “discipline.”8 On the contrary, until the 
19th century, British law expressly permitted a husband to beat his wife with the 
condition that it not be done in a “cruel or violent manner.”9 The familiar 
phrase, “rule of thumb” comes from this era when the common law permitted a 
man to beat his wife with a whipping weapon as long as it was no thicker than his 
thumb. This replaced a law which allowed beating “with any reasonable 
instrument.”10
Obviously, domestic violence against women by men was accepted both legally 
and socially. At the same time, a double standard applied if the wife aggressed 
against her husband. Between the years 1351 to 1858, for example, English law 
provided that if a woman killed her husband, she was liable to be convicted of the 
aggravated offence of “petit treason” (a form of treachery), the sentence for which 
was public execution by burning at the stake.11 If a husband killed his wife, he 
was only liable to be convicted of murder and hanged. The reason was “the 
obedience which in relation of law is due from the wife to the husband.”12
When attempts were made to protect battered women through legal means, 
they were blocked for fear that men’s interests would suffer. For example, when 
John Stuart Mill attempted to champion battered women’s rights in the 1850s and 
’60s through advancing policies which would increase women’s economic
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independence, he was met with opposition arguing the place of women was in the 
home. If women were encouraged to work outside the home, his opponents said, 
the economy of Britain would be endangered with the increase of “underpaid, 
superfluous women” in the marketplace.13 What these opponents of women’s 
rights were effectively saying was that if a choice had to be made between 
protecting the physical liberty and security of women and the economic benefit of 
men, women’s interests were secondary.
Canada’s legal history is similar to that of the systems upon which it is based. 
For example, spousal immunity for rape existed until 1983, and for more than sixty 
years before it was amended, the Criminal Code treated wife abuse more leniently 
than the assault of a stranger.14
In summary, the roots of wife battering are found in and nourished by 
historically embedded discriminatory values and laws. For centuries male-centred, 
sexist norms comprised the rules of acceptable conduct. These values see women 
as nothing more than the property of men -  as the objects of their pleasure, anger 
and contempt. They require women to relinquish their independence upon 
marriage and obey their husbands without question; insist that husbands hold 
unquestionable authority over their wives; dictate that a woman’s place in society 
is in the home, economically and reproductively dependant, serving her husband 
and caring for children; and maintain that the public realm is a man’s world and 
his home, his castle.15 These values informed and underpinned the laws dealing 
with marriage, divorce and wife battery. Few women rebelled16 because the 
historical, legal, economic, cultural and religious context of wife battering 
conditioned women to be dependant and subservient towards their husbands and 
to expect little, if any, recourse from the judicial system. In addition, we have lost 
a great deal of the history of the women who did rebel. Against this backdrop it 
should not be surprising that wife battery was seldom spoken of, rarely reported,
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prosecuted or punished.17
3. Wife Battery is Sex Discrimination18
Since the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Andrews v. Law Society of British 
Columbia,19 courts in Canada have begun to create a new and unique equality 
jurisprudence. In Andrews, the Court concluded that the purpose of the 
constitutional guarantee of equality is the accommodation of differences and the 
remedying of disadvantage in order that individuals may benefit equally from the 
social and political advantages society has to offer.
In its decision the Court rejected the “-similarly situated” test of equality which 
mandated that those who are alike should be treated the same, while those who 
are different may be treated differently. The Court, instead, adopted a purposive 
approach which does not require the same process of comparison in order to 
prove discrimination. The rejection of the similarly situated test now allows courts 
to consider issues such as spousal violence against women, pregnancy discrimina­
tion, abortion laws and other conditions affecting women but not comparable to 
men, to be addressed as sex equality issues.
The equality approach in the Andrews case makes it possible to argue that the 
equality rights of women are implicated in the social practice of wife battery. This 
is because wife battery exists in a societal environment where men assert 
dominance over women -  an environment which includes sexual assault, sexual 
harassment, pornography and other forms of sex discrimination. Just as women 
are sexually harassed, sexually assaulted or sexually abused in pornography because 
of their sex,20 women are abused by their male partners because of their sex. 
The act of beating a wife to “discipline” her or exert power over her is used by the 
batterer to “underscore women’s difference from, and by implication, inferiority 
to the dominant male group” and to remind women of their inferior ascribed 
status.21 When one considers the prevalence of wife abuse,22 and the fear it
17This was pointed out by the Supreme Court in R, v. Lavallee, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852, (1990), 108 N.R. 
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causes, the battering operates as a form of control over women. This in turn 
maintains the historically embedded idea that women are second-class citizens. 
Wife battering operates as both the symbol reinforcing women’s inequality and a 
means of controlling women and keeping them subordinate to men.23
When the overwhelming majority of victims of domestic violence are women 
and the overwhelming majority of perpetrators are men,24 the discriminatory 
nature of the behaviour is underscored. Statistics which indicate that as many as 
one in ten women are battered by their spouse or intimate partner25 (other 
studies indicate the numbers could be much higher)26 require that the behaviour 
must be seen as a social practice rather than as isolated violent incidents.
When viewed as a sex equality issue, the interpretation and application of laws 
dealing with wife abuse must meet the requirements of s. 15 of the Canadian 
Charter o f Rights and Freedoms27 which guarantees women equality before and 
under the law and the right to equal benefit and protection of the law. The 
Supreme Court has directed that the equality provision must be interpreted “in the 
light of the interests it was meant to protect,” which include “equality in the 
formulation and application of the law” and also entail “the promotion of a society 
in which all are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at law as 
equals.”28
Justice Wilson in R. v. Turpin29 recognized the importance of promoting 
equality for disadvantaged groups. She states, “section 15 is designed to protect 
those groups who suffer social, political and legal disadvantage in our society.”30 
In assessing whether a group is discriminated against within the meaning of s. 15, 
she went on to say that inquiry must be directed into “the larger social, political 
and legal context” and enumerated “indicia of discrimination such as stereotyping, 
historical disadvantage or vulnerability to political and social prejudice.”31 In 
order to achieve equality in the context of wife battery, such realities as disparities
n Ibid. at 2-3. 
u Supra, note 3.
25Supra, note 3 at 7; E. Lupri, “Male Violence in the H om e” (1989) Canadian Social Trends at 19-20.
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of power, access to economic opportunity, poverty and vulnerability to assault must 
be considered when deciding whether a law, policy or practice violates s. 15 
equality rights. In other words, a contextualized approach as opposed to a 
sameness of treatment approach, is essential.
4. Sex Equality Dimensions in Case Examples
In R. v. Lavallee,32 the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the inequities 
perpetuated by the “same treatment” model of equality when applied to self- 
defence in the context of wife abuse. The facts of the case were that the accused, 
Angelique Lyn Lavallee, was regularly abused by her common law husband Kevin 
Rust, and had been over a three to four year period. She had required medical 
treatment several times for various fractures, contusions and bruises caused by 
him. After a party on August 30, 1986, there was an altercation between Ms. 
Lavallee and Mr. Rust wherein he told her to “wait till everybody leaves, you’ll get 
it then.” He handed her a gun and told her if she didn’t kill him first, he would 
kill her. After the argument, she shot him in the back of the head with a .303 rifle 
as he was leaving the room. At trial, Ms. Lavallee was acquitted of second degree 
murder by a jury on the basis of self-defence. The Manitoba Court of Appeal set 
aside her acquittal but it was subsequently restored by the Supreme Court of 
Canada where the substantive meaning of self-defence was examined in a 
contextualized way.
In its decision, the Court concluded that battered women who kill their 
partners do not fit into the law’s traditional concept of self-defence. The Court 
said the defence evolved out of a bar-room brawl model which envisioned 
combatants of relatively equal size and strength.33 When applied to battered 
women, the model does not work, based as it is on assumptions about how 
reasonable men behave in a fair fight:
He stands and faces his adversary, meeting fists with fists. He isn’t frightened or
provoked to violence by mere threats; he doesn’t use a weapon unless one is being
used against him; and he doesn’t indulge himself in cowardly behaviour such as
lying in ambush or sneaking upon on an enemy unawares.34
The requirement of imminent danger — that the attack on the accused must be 
underway in order to prove a reasonable belief of apprehension of death or 
grievous bodily harm — comprehends only a male concept of reasonableness. It 
ignores the female perspective of reasonableness which in circumstances of wife 
battery may be quite different. Justice Wilson speaking for the unanimous Court
32Supra , note 17 at 343^14 per Wilson J. speaking for the majority.
33Ibid. at 347.
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states at p.345:
If it strains credulity to imagine what the “ordinary man” would do in the position 
of a battered spouse, it is probably because men do not typically find themselves 
in that situation. Some women do, however. The definition of what is reasonable 
must be adapted to circumstances which are, by and large, foreign to the world 
inhabited by the hypothetical “reasonable man.”
In other words, the Court found that gender was germane to the question of 
reasonableness and decided that in order to be fair to women, it was necessary to 
reconsider the defence.
Although s. 15 of the Charter was not argued in the case,35 it seems clear 
after Lavallee that if the female perspective is not considered when a woman 
invokes the defence, she will be denied equal protection and equal benefit of the 
law. Lavallee is a landmark case because it recognizes that a male-centred 
defence and doctrine which relies on concepts such as “the reasonable man” may 
not meet the needs of women. Changing the configuration of the self-defence 
doctrine to prevent gender bias is a milestone in the history of equality 
jurisprudence. By making gender relevant, the Court opened the door to the 
reconstruction of many other legal doctrines which discriminate against women.
In contrast to Lavallee,36 consider the case of A.L. v. The Crimes 
Compensation Board (Saskatchewan).37 After a history of abuse during the 
marriage, A.L. was severely assaulted by her husband on April 1, 1987. The 
assault occurred after an argument during which the husband threatened to leave 
her and the children without financial support. The wife then said she would pack 
his suitcase and went to the bedroom to do so. He followed her there and 
assaulted her. She sustained serious physical injuries, including a broken back. 
She reported the assault to the police who advised her to refrain from laying 
criminal charges until she separated from her husband which she did two months 
later. The husband subsequently pleaded guilty to the assault. At the time of the 
event, the victim was 45 years of age, had been married for 25 years and had 9 
children, 4 of whom were dependent on her.
Following her husband’s conviction for the assault, she applied to the Crimes 
Compensation Board for compensation for her injuries because the back injury
35The issue before the Court was whether the expert testimony of a psychiatrist was admissible to 
assist the jury in dispelling myths about battered women in deciding whether there was a “reasonable 
apprehension” of death or grievous bodily harm and in assessing the reasonableness o f the accused’s 
belief that killing her batterer was the only way to save her life.
36Supra, note 17.
37(2 June 1988), No. 1901/88 (Crimes Compensation Board of Saskatchewan); (15 March 1990), No. 
2511/90 (Crimes Compensation Board of Saskatchewan).
prevented her from continuing her employment. The Board denied her 
application on the grounds that she “knowingly put herself into circumstances that 
caused injury to herself.” The Board said she was aware of her husband’s 
tendency to violence yet continued to associate with him. This association the 
Board said, resulted in injuries to herself, a situation which was found to fall 
within an exemption under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act.38 
Furthermore, the Board found that her actions in going to the bedroom to pack 
his suitcase amounted to provocation stating “the applicant should have been 
aware that her actions on the date in question would aggravate him and lead to 
his violent behaviour'.”39
After a series of appeals,40 the Board reheard the case, yet still found that 
A.L. was “the author of her own misfortune,” and that “a reasonably prudent 
person could have foreseen the consequences of her actions.”
The position taken by the Board resurrects the myths and stereotypes the 
Supreme Court discredited and rejected in Lavallee. The Board’s decision 
effectively gives credence to the stereotypes that women who are battered choose, 
provoke and deserve to be beaten and are partially or wholly responsible for the 
violence directed against them. It also raises the Charter equality issues as to 
whether equal benefit and protection of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 
was denied to A.L. on the basis of sex and whether A.L.’s s. 7 right to equal 
security in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice as protected by 
s. 28 of the Charter was breached. I will deal with the two issues of reasonable 
foreseeability and provocation in terms of their equality implications.
(a) Reasonable Foreseeability
Compensatory relief under the Saskatchewan Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Act depends upon whether the injury was a “reasonably foreseeable” consequence 
of the complainant’s action. In the context of wife battery, the same issue of 
gender relevance arises here as it did in Lavallee. What is “reasonable” in 
situations of domestic or other violence against women may be quite different than 
what is reasonable where other crimes are concerned.
If the Board was correct in the way it applied the reasonableness standard in 
A.L., a woman’s mere presence in a place where violence is foreseeable could be 
seen as an acceptance of the risk of assault. Is the Board suggesting that if a 
woman goes to a bar alone or goes for a walk alone at night and is assaulted, she
38R.S.S. 1978, c. C-47, s. 11(a).
^(31 July 1990), No. 2511/90 (Crimes Compensation Board of Saskatchewan).
40ÆL. v. The Crimes Compensation Board (Saskatchewan) (24 May 1991), No. 4721 (Q.B.).
is contributing to her own assault? What about hitchhiking alone or inviting a 
male to her apartment? In Canadian society, violence against women is a reality 
and it is foreseeable in such places, but should women be blamed for it? In 
addition to blaming victims, this approach penalizes women for doing things that 
men freely do without any penalty or restriction.
The Board’s decision implies that the solution to the foreseeability problem for 
women is to leave the abusive setting in which they live if they wish to be 
compensated for their injuries. If this is correct, one could argue by analogy that 
victims of sexual harassment at their place of work or victims of crime in high 
crime neighbourhoods, must be partially to blame for their victimization unless 
they quit their employment or move away. The Board faltered in this case 
because when it assessed reasonableness, it failed to take into account the 
dynamics of wife abuse and the general context of inequality within which women 
live.
The Board’s assumption that women like A.L. can leave their abusive husbands 
but unreasonably refuse to do so is gender biased because it makes the assessment 
from a dominant, male perspective. First hand accounts by many battered women 
demonstrate that they are often trapped in the relationships A  decision to stay with 
an abusive husband is perfectly reasonable if from the wife’s point of view, there 
is no other place to go.Financial and emotional dependence on their husbands; 
concern for the welfare and their custody of the children; lack of emergency 
housing and day care; lack of support from law enforcement agencies; the fear of 
public exposure; inadequate social support networks; the fear of greater injury; and 
the tendency of society to blame women rather than their assailants are the 
reasons battered women cite for staying in violent relationships.41 All are related 
to the unequal social position of women which the Board failed to take into 
account when interpreting the “reasonably prudent person” test. For example, 
battered women have stated:42
I was in a trap I couldn’t get out of -  having no money.
I doubt there are very many women who have never been abused by a man in their 
lives. Our very economic dependence on them brings about many of these 
undesirable living conditions.
41Women in Transition, a Canada Works Project (Thunder Bay, Ontario: 1978) cited in supra, note 3 
at 29. See also, R. E. Dobash and R. Dobash, Violence Against Wives: A  Case Against Patriarchy (New  
York: Free Press, 1979); L. Chamers and P. Smith, “Wife Battering: Psychological, Social and Physical 
Isolation and Counteracting Strategies” in A.T. McLaren, ed., Gender and Society (Toronto: Copp 
Clark Pitman, 1988) at 221; L. Freedman, “Wife Assault” in C. Guberman & M. Wolf, eds, N o Safe 
Place: Violence Against Women and Children (Toronto: The W omen’s Press, 1985) at 41; L.A. Hoff, 
Battered Women as Survivors (London: Rentledge, 1990).
42Supra, note 3.
I put up with not only physical abuse but all kinds of mental abuse because I had 
six children to care for and needed a home and food for them which I couldn’t 
provide myself.
I heard the policeman say to my husband -  ‘Look, I believe a man’s home is his 
castle.’
Statements are often made from the bench that make light of these very serious 
cases, which can often lead to homicide. Our local papers are filled each week with 
stories of domestic fatalities often after [the victims] turning to the courts for help  
and assistance, and not having been believed when they described their abuse and 
their fear of death ... [c]ourt officers use terms such as “Punch and Judy” cases ...
I felt afraid to go outside the house -  afraid that people would find out, afraid of 
what they would say -  that I was a bad wife and deserved it.
Other cultural, ethnic, racial and social reasons may exacerbate the inability 
of women to leave battering relationships. For example, native women may risk 
the loss of social benefits as well as their cultural identity if they leave their 
reserves; immigrant women who leave may be repudiated by their own cultural 
community, face insurmountable communication barriers or fear deportation if 
they leave the person who sponsored them for landed status; disabled and rural 
women may be unable to access day care, temporary housing or social support 
networks.43
A battered woman’s decision to remain in her own home should not be used 
against her. If it is, not only is the responsibility for the abuse improperly diverted 
from the abuser to the victim, the social and psychological context of unequal 
power in which wife battering generally occurs is ignored.
The Board’s failure to adapt “reasonableness” to women’s circumstances not 
only renders its decision gender-biased, it penalizes victims of wife abuse in a way 
which victims of other multiple crimes are not penalized. The example of multiple 
property crimes makes the point. When mere possession of property is an 
insufficient basis for holding property owners responsible for repeated thefts or 
burglaries,44 staying in one’s own home, albeit a violent one, should similarly be 
an insufficient basis for holding battered wives responsible for repeated beatings.
A second questionable assumption underlying the Board’s finding that it was 
unreasonable for A.L. to stay in the matrimonial home, is that there are safer 
places for battered women to go. Studies indicate that separation does not 
guarantee that the battering will end. Violence often escalates after a woman has
43Chamers & Smith, supra, note 41.
^L EA F, supra, note 18 at 20.
separated from her abusive partner because the abuser is angered at losing control 
over her. Numerous research reports indicate that batterers often threaten to 
come after a battered woman, find her, and seriously injure, maim or kill her if 
she leaves.45 Littleton points out that the statistical incidence of “recapture” — 
husbands finding wives (or partners) and beating them again — makes a mockery 
of the “duty to retreat” concept in self-defence.46 It has also been found that the 
fear engendered by such threats is usually well founded and protective remedies 
such as restraining orders, injunctions and bail conditions are often ineffectual 
protective remedies for battered women and their children.47
Finally, the Board failed to consider the “battered woman syndrome” in its 
decision notwithstanding the fact that expert evidence was called to describe why 
battered women stay with their batterers.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Lavallee, in admitting expert evidence on the 
battered woman syndrome, recognized that many myths and stereotypes surround 
the question of why women stay and that triers of fact are as susceptible to being 
mislead by them as the general public. The Court stated at page 344:
The average member of the public (or of the jury) can be forgiven for asking: Why 
would a woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to 
live with such a man? How could she love a partner who beat her to the point of 
requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman to pack her bags and go. 
Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for 
herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called 
“battered wife syndrome.” We need help to understand it and help is available 
from trained professionals.
And then at 345:
A  woman who comes before a judge or jury with the claim that she has been  
battered and suggests that this may be a relevant factor in evaluating her 
subsequent actions still faces the prospect of being condemned by popular 
mythology about domestic violence. Either she was not as badly beaten as she 
claims or she would have left the man long ago. Or, if she was battered that
45C.P. Ewing, Battered Women Who Kill. Psychological Self-Defense as Legal Justification (Lexington: 
D.C. Heath & Company, 1987) at 13.
46C. Littleton, “W omen’s Experience and the Problem o f Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering 
of W omen” (1989) University o f Chicago Legal Forum 23 at 36.
47For example, the study by the Manitoba Association of Women and the Law, (M AW L) Gender 
Equality in the Courts: Criminal L aw  (1991) at 3-50 points to the example o f the Winnipeg woman 
murdered by her former boyfriend who had been arrested on three occasions within the few weeks 
preceding her death and released each time on bail, apparently with the consent o f the Crown in each 
case. See also D. Martin, “Marital Conflict Mediation and Post-Separation Wife A buse” (1990) 8 Law 
and Inequality 317.
severely, she must have stayed out of some masochistic enjoyment of it.48
Instead of reflecting and reinforcing these damaging stereotypes, the Supreme 
Court questioned them. The Court was of the view that the average person or 
jury member does not necessarily understand why a woman would put up with 
battering on a continual basis and that expert evidence was necessary to dispel the 
deeply held myths and stereotypes and restore the battered victim’s credibility. 
Testimony regarding the “cycle of violence” and “learned helplessness” is required 
to help judges and juries understand the psychological barriers which prevent or 
hinder an abused wife from escaping her situation. Had the Board in A.L. 
seriously considered the battered women’s syndrome in their analysis, continuing 
residence with an abusive spouse would likely not have been considered 
unreasonable. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Lavallee acknowledged that 
there is no duty for a battered woman to retreat from her home within the context 
of self-defence. It follows that a woman should not be penalized under criminal 
injuries compensation legislation for staying in her home.
(b) Provocation
As an additional ground for denying compensation, the Board in theA.L. case 
found that the wife contributed to her injuries by packing her husband’s suitcase 
after he announced he would leave. The Board saw this conduct as a provocative 
act which precipitated the husband’s act of violence rather than as a protective and 
prudent act on the part of the wife calculated to preserve her own safety.
This finding embodies all the old stereotypes that have been so damaging for 
women in the past. It contravenes A.L.’s equality rights under s. 15 and s. 28 of 
the Charter and denies her security rights under s. 7. The Board’s interpretation 
of s. 11(a) of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act implies that a battered 
woman must adopt a submissive and subordinate role in relation to the batterer 
in order to remain eligible for full compensation under the Act. The decision 
effectively says a battered wife cannot protest her husband’s actions or do anything 
that may cause him to become angry and beat her again, such as challenging his 
authority or control over her. It also suggests that the victim of domestic violence 
has control over her victimization. If she would stop provoking her assailant, she 
would not get hit.
The defence of provocation in criminal law has a “reasonableness” require­
ment. In order to exculpate the accused from responsibility for the offence or 
reduce his culpability, the provocation must be such that it deprives an ordinary 
person of self-control. In the case of A.L., the act which the Board found to 
amount to provocation was the wife packing the husband’s suitcase in response to
48Supra, note 17 at 344.
his threat to leave. If the criminal standard was used, the Board must have 
concluded that his rage in response to such an act was “reasonable” and that 
breaking his wife’s back was an act which should be forgiven. Legitimizing these 
sexist, discriminatory attitudes and reactions is clearly in violation of s. 15 and s. 
28 of the Charter insofar as the guarantee of equal protection of the law is 
concerned. To accommodate by law the violent enforcement of male dominance 
and female subordination is untenable in a country which has gender equality as 
an entrenched constitutional guarantee. The practical result is to permit more 
powerful members of society to prey with impunity upon more vulnerable 
members. Section 28 which states, “notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the 
rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female 
persons” requires equality in relation to other Charter rights. The Board clearly 
breached this section by diminishing women’s bodily security rights in comparison 
with those of men in the context of a gender specific offence. Moreover, this 
interpretation and application of s. 11(a) harms women by reducing the compensa­
tion they would otherwise be awarded. In a contextualized analysis, it perpetuates 
women’s disadvantage, justifies male dominance and denies her equal benefit of 
the law under s. 15 of the Charter. Even if the woman’s conduct is not exemplary 
in the Judge’s eyes, it is not legal justification for her to be assaulted and battered 
— “the author of her own misfortune.”
(c) Sentencing and the Protection of Victims
The sentencing of wife abusers is a crucially important step in the legal 
process. Punishment for wrongs plays an important role in shaping societal 
attitudes and behaviours. If violence in the home is unacceptable behaviour in 
Canada, the judiciary must react in such a way that abusers and society understand 
that wife abuse is a crime, and that its victims are as entitled to the protection of 
the law as are victims of other crimes. Yet history and practice show that the 
judicial system generally views wife assault as a domestic dispute, a matter of civil 
rather than criminal law. This has trivialized the seriousness of the offence which 
in turn has often resulted in inappropriate sentencing decisions.
Trivializing wife assault by viewing it as a domestic matter rather than as a 
serious criminal offence causes discrimination against women in terms of their 
right to equal protection of the law and equal right to life, liberty and security of 
the person as protected in s. 28, s. 15 and s. 7 of the Charter. Studies and case 
analysis show that when judges fail to take domestic assault seriously, they tend to 
give less credence to the victims’ fears, injuries and experiences; take inappropriate 
mitigating factors into account; and give far lighter sentences to abusers than they 
would for similar assaults against strangers.
As an example, the Maryland Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the 
Courts, found substantial evidence that the judiciary failed to give victims the
credibility they deserved. One witness spoke of her attempts to get help after her 
husband threatened to kill her with a gun:
The thing that has never left my mind from that point to now is what the judge 
said to me. He took a few minutes to decide on the matter and he looked at me 
and he said, “I don’t believe anything that you’re saying.” He said, “The reason 
I don’t believe it is because I don’t believe that anything like this could happen to 
me. If I was you and someone had threatened me with a gun, there is no way that 
I would continue to stay with them. There is no way that I could take that kind 
of abuse from them. Therefore, since I would not let that happen to me, I can’t 
believe that it happened to you.”49
An advocate for battered women told the Committee about a judge who 
wanted to know whether counselling programs for families involved with violence 
are able to “flush out all these women who are lying.” Another judge denied an 
application for a protective order because he did not believe that the husband 
would behave in the manner the victim described because he was a doctor. Yet 
another judge did not believe the victim had been beaten because she did not have 
any bruises. In one case the judge called the victim “one hell of an actress,” 
despite clear and consistent testimony by the victim and a witness that her husband 
had beaten her frequently. One woman was beaten by her husband over the 
weekend between two court hearings, and she appeared at the second hearing 
wearing a neck brace because of the injuries he inflicted. The judge’s response 
was, “anyone could put on a neck brace just to make him think something had 
happened.”50
In other cases, judges take certain mitigating factors into account which, if they 
viewed the crime more seriously, wouldn’t be considered in the sentencing 
assessment. For example, judges sometimes decide not to imprison an individual 
for serious abuse because they think that to leave a dependant spouse and children 
without any means of support doubly victimizes them. The competing argument, 
that the wife and children may be re-victimized if the offender is free to return to 
the home to continue the abuse, is often not given enough weight.
The marital relationship and emotions between the parties is another factor 
sometimes used to inappropriately mitigate sentence.51 Judges infer that it is the 
“relationship” that has led to the criminal activity and somehow that makes it 
more understandable. An example of this is the disposition in R. v. Fern Wayne 
Kreton.52 The accused first attempted to run down his wife’s son with his vehicle. 
Within a month, he breached an order prohibiting him from having any contact
49Maryland Special Joint Committee, Gender Bias in the Courts (May 1989) at 3. 
x Ibid. at 4.
5lR. v. Fern Wayne Kreton (6 February 1990), (Man. Prov. Ct) at 26 [unreported].
52Ibid.
with his wife, attacked her in her apartment building, choked her, attempted to 
throw her over a third floor railing, dragged her out of the building, smashed her 
head on the sidewalk, repeatedly kicked her in the head and threatened her with 
a knife. The woman suffered injuries including a fractured nose, a fractured arm, 
numerous bruises and abrasions to all parts of her body and severe lacerations to 
her hands resulting in permanent damage to her tendons. While incarcerated 
prior to the trial, the accused wrote a letter to the victim stating, “I will not nicely 
go away and leave you until I am dead.” The result of the case was a jail sentence 
of six months with eighteen months probation. The judge was clearly influenced 
by the existence of the “relationship.” In his sentencing comments, he says:
These cases, as counsel has alluded to, are unique in that people that otherwise 
wouldn’t engage in criminal conduct, due to matrimonial affairs, unfortunately 
often lead to criminal conduct. People who wouldn’t ever come into a courtroom 
in a criminal context get themselves into situations because of emotions, because 
of lack of perception, will be unable to deal with the problem or see it properly 
and therefore do things that, if other facts had been different, would never have 
appeared before the court.53
In a similar case in the same jurisdiction but one involving strangers, the Court 
imposed a four-year sentence.54 This approach is difficult to justify. 
“Relationship” is not taken into account as a mitigating factor in circumstances 
other than sexual or domestic assaults.55 Arguably the existence of relationship 
should not diminish the sentence. Perhaps it should result in a harsher sentence 
for a person convicted of a battering offence because of the breach of trust 
between parties in a relationship of unequal power. The crime if viewed as a 
crime, would seem to be more serious and reprehensible in this context than 
where the parties are strangers or where the exchange is between equals.56
A related issue is the sentencing range in domestic assault cases. Compared 
to cases of stranger assault, the sentencing range appears to be significantly lower. 
For example, in R. v. Eugene Vincent Gaywish,57 the batterer assaulted his 
common-law wife with a stick or club. At trial, he received a suspended sentence 
plus supervised probation. The Court of Appeal added 100 hours of community 
service but declined to impose a prison sentence. It is doubtful that the same
53Ibid. at 41-42. The Manitoba Court of Appeal increased the six-month sentence to eighteen months 
for aggravated assault. In light of the fourteen-year maximum for this offence, even the Court of 
Appeal’s disposition is extremely light.
54R  v. Peter Dennis Rose, [1989] Man. D. 7112-04.
55For example, the MAWL Report, supra, note 47, at 3-17 asks, “Would the judge have similarly 
commented and sentenced if an ‘em otional’ employee viciously assaulted his former employer ... after 
the termination of the em ployer/em ployee relationship?”
XR. v. Inwood, [1989] 69 C.R. (3d) 181 at 188.
^[1989] Man. D. 7110-01.
offence between strangers or those in a non-intimate relationship would have had 
the same result.
In another case, a batterer assaulted his common-law wife with a garden 
spade, breaking the handle in the process. A history of repeated assaults was 
reported yet the disposition was a two-year suspended sentence.58 At about the 
same time, in the same jurisdiction, a man who mistreated his pet kitten was 
sentenced to a three-month jail term.59
An even more extreme example is R. v. Chaisson60 where a husband who tied 
his wife to a chair, taped her mouth, manually abused her and burned her breasts, 
received a mere twelve-month suspended sentence and an eighteen-month 
probation order. The reasoning of the court was that its primary objective should 
be to facilitate and not to impede the reconciliation of the spouses.61
What judges in cases like these do not seem to appreciate is that treating 
violence as a marital dispute does not make it end. Rather than punish and deter, 
light sentences indirectly support the use of violence against women because they 
discourage victims from reporting incidents of abuse and send the message to 
perpetrators and society generally, that this form of violence is not serious.
(d) Contempt Proceedings
When victims of domestic violence fail to testify against their abusers, the 
decision as to whether or not to find them in contempt and punish them, raises 
difficult issues for a judge. On the one hand, failure to testify frustrates the legal 
process and results in wasted time and expense in bringing accused batterers 
before the Court. On the other hand, the Court may participate in the on-going 
victimization of the battered woman if it finds her in contempt and fines or 
incarcerates her.
If a judge fails to keep the dynamics of the battering relationship in mind and 
assumes the victim is flaunting a court order or showing disrespect for the legal 
process, the decision to punish may be gender biased and violate the woman’s 
equality rights. The laying of a contempt charge against a victim of abuse may 
engage s. 15 equality rights if it has a differential impact based on sex compared 
to the laying of contempt charges in other circumstances. It must be borne in 
mind that women as a group are physically more vulnerable to threats. It is also
58Winnipeg Free Press (24 February 24 1989) 10, cited in MAWL Report, supra, note 47 at 3-26.
xIbid. at 3-26, 3-27.
^(1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 170 at 173 (S.C.A.D.).
6lIbid.
true that abusive husbands or partners are able to intimidate their wives or 
partners from testifying through coercive means. If a woman has been threatened 
with violent retaliation by the abusive spouse and at the same time there is 
inadequate state protection for her physical well-being, it is hardly legitimate for 
a judge to punish her for taking the rational step of refusing to testify in order to 
protect herself.62 The question the Court should ask is, who should bear the 
risk? It could be argued that unless the state can satisfy the court that realistic 
protection for the witness is available, the woman should not be convicted of 
contempt.63 In their Feminist Review of Criminal Law, Boyîc et al., address this 
point:
The law of contempt might work more harshly against women than against men 
because women may be physically more vulnerable to threats. Adequate resources 
may not be devoted to their protection. Guilty persons may be acquitted because 
women are treated as being less credible and so will be in a position to carry out 
their threats.. .  Persons should therefore not be convicted of contempt for refusing 
to testify unless the State can satisfy the court that realistic protection is available 
for the witness.64
5. Conclusion
One could summarize this paper by saying two things: first, that wife battering 
must be understood broadly — by looking at the family as a societal institution with 
roles, functions and traditional relationships with other institutions such as law, 
employment and religion; and second, that consideration of wife battering must be 
sensitive to the feminist perspective. It is a mistake, in my view, to perceive wife 
battering as a series of isolated aberrations from the norm and to treat the family 
as a particular and personal group of individuals. If incidents of wife battery are 
viewed in isolation from their historical and economic context, their systemic 
aspects are hidden and the role of the police, crown prosecutors, judges and other 
actors in the process is obscured. If wife battery is viewed solely from the 
dominant male perspective, we virtually deny the existential reality of women and 
the case they have made about the justice system as we know it.
Over the past several years, in first the United States and then in Canada, a 
great deal of effort has been expended on demonstrating that many areas of the 
law as written, interpreted and applied are gender-biased or sexist.65 There are 
many reasons for this state of affairs, not the least of which is the fact that no
62A Feminist Review o f  Criminal L aw  by C. Boyle et al. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services 
Canada, 1985) at 32.
63Ibid.
MIbid.
define gender-biased or sexist approaches as those informed and shaped by a male viewpoint 
resulting in a distorted picture o f social reality.
woman had a voice in the design of legal institutions or methodologies that rule 
the social order under which women as well as men, live.66 Further, the 
condition of women or their interests were not taken into account or represented 
by the men who created the social order. There are huge amounts of historical 
evidence which support this,67 so I do not think it is an arguable point.
There is also now an impressive array of literature that demonstrates that 
gender bias and sexism exist in law -  many of these works are cited in the MAWL 
Report.68 Hundreds of others exist. There seems to be some dawning awareness 
on the part of judges, government and legal educators that women have been 
unjustifiably excluded from consideration and that there is some need to integrate 
their concerns into law. This is manifested in national conferences such as “The 
Socialization of Judges to Equality Issues” held in 1986, The Canadian Association 
of Law Teacher’s conference on Gender Issues in Legal Education held this year, 
the Justice Minister’s National Symposium on Women and the Administration of 
Justice held in June 1991 and the various judicial education seminars that have 
been held in Vancouver, Lake Louise, Yellowknife and Charlottetown.
New textbooks such as Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory,69 Equality and 
Judicial Neutrality70 and Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter o f Rights and 
Freedoms71 include a number of articles or chapters on women or discuss some 
aspect of gender and sex roles. University law faculties have courses on feminist 
legal theory, and are now incorporating feminist critique into mainstream courses 
such as Torts, Remedies, Contract, Criminal Law, Family Law, Constitutional Law, 
Legal History, Jurisprudence and so on. There are also a growing number of 
special publications which specifically publish feminist work such as Signs, 
Canadian Journal o f Women and the Law and the Harvard Women’s Law Journal. 
There are chairs for women’s studies at universities, special scholarships for 
feminist research and institutes focused on women and their changing role in 
society. In other words, there is tangible evidence that women now constitute a 
legitimate area of legal interest. This is in contrast to earlier times when many of 
the same criticisms and suggestions being made now, were unable to penetrate
^ C A . MacKinnon, “Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law” (1991) 100 Yale Law Jo. 1281 at 1281.
67See, for example, MAWL Report, supra, note 47; C. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory o f State 
(Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1989); L.L. Crites & W.L Hepperle, Women, the Courts 
and Equality (Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage, 1987); M. McTeer, “The Time For Change is Now” in S.C. 
Martin & K.E. Mahoney, eds, Equality and Judicial Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987).
68Supra, note 47.
WR. Devlin, ed., (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery, 1991).
70K. M ahoney & S. Martin, eds, (Toronto: Carswell, 1987).
71A. Bayefsky & M. Eberts, eds, (Toronto: Carswell, 1985).
institutional structures sufficiently to make it into official agendas.72
Margrit Eichler has written about sexism in social science and possible 
responses to it.73 I think her approach is transferrable to the issue of sexism in 
law. She makes the point that certain paradigms guide knowledge and inquiry. At 
their most general level, the paradigms can be identified as “normality.” 
Paradigms of this sort are based upon a set of rules and assumptions which many 
do not even realize exist because there is such widespread agreement on them. 
The existence of such paradigms determine the choice of problems, issues and 
solutions to be studied within their framework. Paradigms do not change unless 
there is some feeling of crisis — evoked by an anomaly which is so important and 
weighty that it calls the entire paradigm into question. People begin to search for 
alternative solutions. This is a lengthy process, one which it is impossible to time 
exactly or to attribute with precision to one individual only. It is a collective 
process rather than an individual shift in thinking. Is sexism or gender bias in the 
way in which the law deals with wife abuse serious enough to require a paradigm 
shift in thinking? Is the problem fundamental enough? Pierre Trudeau’s famous 
comment that, “the state has no place in the bedrooms of the nation” is significant 
in its stunning inappropriateness to wife abuse. The criminal law has traditionally 
avoided the private sphere, based on the notion that “a man’s home is his castle” 
and concentrated on maintaining order and peace in the public realm. However, 
the truth of the matter is that women in increasing numbers are beaten, tortured 
and killed in the bedrooms of the nation.
What we have today, and what needs to be addressed, is a covert system which 
allows violence as a private matter between husband and wife. The family is by 
and large placed outside the rules and laws of society. A blind eye is turned to the 
use of violence by a husband against a wife in the name of the sanctity of 
marriage. The result is that when a woman who is battered looks for help outside 
her family, she discovers that her plea for safety and sometimes survival elicits 
platitudes about the privacy of the home and the proper role for women. The 
battering issue must be seen and understood within a new paradigm, which 
questions the vast network of official and non-official procedures and attitudes 
which are institutionalized and biased against women. Until we attack it at that 
level, nothing of substance will change.
72M. Eichler, “The Relationship Between Sexist, Non-Sexist, Woman-Centered and Feminist 
Research” in Studies in Communication, vol. 3 (Toronto; JÂI Press, 1986) 37 at 42; R. Herschberger, 
A d a m ’s Rib (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); D. Spender, Man M ade Language (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983); A. Rossi, ed., The Feminist Papers: From A dm as to de Beauvoir 
(New York: Bantam Books, 1973).
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